Science of the Gaps

July 17, 2009
By J. Joseph Porter
Most of us have heard of “God of the gaps” arguments, arguments that argue for the existence of God from “gaps” in the scientific record. If Science cannot explain some natural phenomenon, then God exists – or so the argument goes. Such arguments have been roundly (and, for the most part, rightly) criticized both by theists and non-theists.

It is not too difficult to see the flaws in “God of the gaps” reasoning: “gaps” in Science have a funny habit of being filled. In fact, some people think that scientific “gaps” are filling so well that Science will soon be able to answer all questions – eliminating God in the process. According to them, theism (a redundant hypothesis with no explanatory power) will be summarily rejected as Science continually expands Its frontiers. In essence, these people are advancing a “Science of the gaps” argument; rather than assuming that God will fill the gaps, they are assuming that Science will. (It should be noted that most of these people are not scientists; scientists, by and large, recognize the confines of their discipline.)

Regrettably, “Science of the gaps” arguments have received much less critical scrutiny than “God of the gaps” arguments have. I say this is regrettable because “Science of the gaps” arguments are just as suspect as “God of the gaps” arguments are (if not more so).

This is probably not how it happened.

This is probably not how it happened.

I should probably begin by explaining what I mean by “Science.” (This is by no means the place for a rigorous definition of Science, but some rough account will suffice.) The word “Science,” in my mind, refers to the aggregation of  current human theories and knowledge regarding the empirical (i.e., observable) world.

In light of this preliminary definition – which briefly encapsulates the who (people), what (current theories and knowledge), and how (observation) of Science – I would like to reflect on some (not all) of Science’s necessary limitations and their impact upon “Science of the gaps” arguments.

First of all, Science is fundamentally human. It consists of human ideas extrapolated from human observations, and is therefore circumscribed by the boundaries of human experience and human thought (like any human endeavor).

Unfortunately for Science, human experience is significantly constrained. I could focus on the fact that we only have five main observational tools (the five senses) or on the fact that our observations are fallible at best and completely unreliable at worst. Instead, however, I will point out that we humans are only physically capable of observing a very tiny fraction of spacetime. What was the universe like one million years ago? The simple answer is that we do not know for sure.

Fortunately for Science, a small amount of observational data can be universalized into general theories. An apple that falls from a tree can become the law of gravity. What was the universe like one million years ago? We may not know for sure…but we can certainly infer.

There’s a catch, though: a lot of different theories can explain the same data. Newton’s law of gravity certainly explained the apple that fell on his head – but if Newton had instead postulated that an invisible poltergeist was harassing him with projectile fruit, no one would have been able to tell him that his idea “did not account for the data.” (After all, “gravity” is just as invisible as poltergeists.) And yet, our intuition is that the law of gravity is (for the most part) very reasonable, while speculation about poltergeists is stupid. In other words, we have an intuition that there are non-empirical criteria by which our theories about the empirical world should be evaluated. One such criterion is Occam’s razor: entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem (entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity). Another is inductive reasoning; if apples always fall down to the ground rather than floating up to the sky, then it is reasonable to expect future apples to fall and not to float.

This means that the entire scientific enterprise depends not only on empirical data, but also on basic intuitions about how the world works – philosophies of science. Science can only exist when certain philosophical assumptions about metaphysics (how things fundamentally are) and epistemology (how we know things) are made.

That, in and of itself, is enough to refute “Science of the gaps” arguments. Whether or not God exists is a metaphysical question – a specific kind of philosophical question -not a scientific one. Science alone cannot answer that sort of question.

Perhaps it is clear enough that Science alone cannot answer theological questions. But there are plenty of other sorts of questions that Science alone cannot answer: “Why is there something rather than nothing?” or “Why does the universe behave according to predictable principles and ‘laws’?” Science might be able to tell you how the “something” works or describe the predictable principles according to which the universe behaves – but nothing (or not much) more.

Since there is no clear line demarcating “Science” from “not-Science,” arguing that Science can or cannot answer all questions is, in a way, futile. But it should be obvious (I hope) that Science is not going to kill God, just as God cannot kill science. On the contrary, God must be evaluated on philosophical and theological grounds.

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5 Responses to Science of the Gaps

  1. Cameron D. Kirk-Giannini on July 17, 2009 at 4:38 pm

    This is very good thinking. I especially like the sound of “Science of the gaps.” That said, I’m not sure your argument here works.

    First, you set out to show that part of the work of science is the construction of theories. Then you point out that these theories are evaluated on the basis of non-empirical criteria. So far so good – this is clearly correct. But then you argue that the above facts imply that science cannot have anything to say about the existence of God because the question of God is a metaphysical rather than a scientific one. On what grounds are you making this distinction? It seems to me that when you conceded that theory-forming is a part of science, you opened the door for science to come to metaphysical conclusions (i.e. there is no aether). Unless you are trying to say that non-empirical criteria like Occam’s razor and the principle of induction are in fact inappropriate in God talk, which I don’t think will fly very well with many people. I suppose the discussion is confounded by an ambiguity in our definition of science. Science, as a theory-forming entity, can say things about God. Science, as a purely empirical enterprise (if such a thing can exist) can say nothing about God.

    The problem, as I see it, is that the work of theory forming and the work of empirical data collection require exceedingly different sets of skills, such that the people who we consider “scientists” are hardly qualified to draw serious conclusions from their work. The other half of science, the theoretical half, is done by philosophers. This, too, is problematic, because philosophers often feel little need to respect what has been empirically determined. So the whole system is dysfunctional.

    As long as you admit that science has something to say about poltergeists, you have to admit that it can also have something to say about God.

  2. J. Joseph Porter on July 17, 2009 at 4:47 pm

    Thanks for the comment, Nico!

    Part of the problem is that I didn’t provide a rigorous definition of Science, which I tried to acknowledge at the end.

    You’re right in saying that the problem is an ambiguity in the definition of “Science.” We define Science mostly by the interests of scientists, not by a coherent definition of “Science.” This means that “Science” can end up meaning a lot of different things. For example, if we define Science as “theories based on empirical data,” we’re basically defining Science as a posteriori knowledge. But how do we restrict our definition? It’s difficult to say.

    However, I think the main point that I was trying to make is that the sorts of conclusions that scientists tend to make are based on philosophical considerations that are largely independent of the empirical data. And considerations about God, for the most part, fall into that category.

    This is very good thinking. I especially like the sound of “Science of the gaps.” That said, I’m not sure your argument here works.

    First, you set out to show that part of the work of science is the construction of theories. Then you point out that these theories are evaluated on the basis of non-empirical criteria. So far so good – this is clearly correct. But then you argue that the above facts imply that science cannot have anything to say about the existence of God because the question of God is a metaphysical rather than a scientific one. On what grounds are you making this distinction? It seems to me that when you conceded that theory-forming is a part of science, you opened the door for science to come to metaphysical conclusions (i.e. there is no aether). Unless you are trying to say that non-empirical criteria like Occam’s razor and the principle of induction are in fact inappropriate in God talk, which I don’t think will fly very well with many people. I suppose the discussion is confounded by an ambiguity in our definition of science. Science, as a theory-forming entity, can say things about God. Science, as a purely empirical enterprise (if such a thing can exist) can say nothing about God.

    The problem, as I see it, is that the work of theory forming and the work of empirical data collection require exceedingly different sets of skills, such that the people who we consider “scientists” are hardly qualified to draw serious conclusions from their work. The other half of science, the theoretical half, is done by philosophers. This, too, is problematic, because philosophers often feel little need to respect what has been empirically determined. So the whole system is dysfunctional.

    As long as you admit that science has something to say about poltergeists, you have to admit that it can also have something to say about God.

  3. Nick Nowalk on July 19, 2009 at 1:20 am

    John, here is the passage in C. S. Lewis I alluded to:

    “Please do not think that one of these views [i.e. naturalism and supernaturalism] was held a long time ago and that the other has gradually taken its place. Wherever there have been thinking men both views turn up. And not this too. You cannot find out which view is the right one by science in the ordinary sense. Science works by experiments. It watches how things behave. Every scientific statement in the long run, however complicated it looks, really means something like, ‘I pointed the telescope to such and such a part of the sky at 2:20am on January 15th and saw so-and-so,’ or, ‘I put some of this stuff in a pot and heated it to such-and-such a temperature and it did so-and-so.’ Do not think I am saying anything against science: I am only saying what its job is.

    And the more scientific a man is, the more (I believe) he would agree with me that this is the job of science—and a very useful and necessary job it is too. But why anything comes to be there at all, and whether there is anything behind the things science observes—something of a different kind—this is not a scientific question. If there is ‘Something Behind’, then either it will have to remain altogether unknown to men or else make itself known in some different way. The statement that there is any such thing, and the statement that there is no such thing, are neither of them statements that science can make. And real scientists do not usually make them. It is usually the journalists and popular novelists who have picked up a few odds and ends of half-baked science from textbooks who go in for them. After all, it really is a matter of common sense. Supposing science ever became complete so that it knew every single thing in the whole universe. Is it not plain that the questions, ‘Why is there a universe?’ ‘Why does it go on as it does?’ ‘Has it any meaning?’ would remain just as they were?” (C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, pp. 22-23)

  4. John on July 22, 2009 at 12:58 am

    What if in Truth and Reality there is no gap? And just an over-whelming Brightness.

    Please check out these related references on the relation between religion, science and culture

    1. http://www.adidam.org/teaching/aletheon/truth-science.aspx

    2. http://www.dabase.org/dht7.htm

    3. http://www.dabase.org/broken.htm

  5. Paul on January 25, 2010 at 11:02 am

    I would agree, “Science of the gaps” arguments are just as suspect as “God of the gaps” arguments are (if not more so)” However, we may not agree on what that is.
    What I have seen in conversations with Atheists is that they are quick to shout, “God of The Gaps”, yet when you ask them to tell you how life began, they say no one knows, yet science is getting closer and closer to understanding it.
    To me that is “Science of the Gaps”.
    Faith need not be in God alone. For some it seems to rest firmly on Science, and this is the crutch that allows many an atheist to hobble down the path called “faith”, (although it horrifies them to think it is a path of “faith”).

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