Please check out these related references on the relation between religion, science and culture

1. http://www.adidam.org/teaching/aletheon/truth-science.aspx

2. http://www.dabase.org/dht7.htm

3. http://www.dabase.org/broken.htm

“Please do not think that one of these views [i.e. naturalism and supernaturalism] was held a long time ago and that the other has gradually taken its place. Wherever there have been thinking men both views turn up. And not this too. You cannot find out which view is the right one by science in the ordinary sense. Science works by experiments. It watches how things behave. Every scientific statement in the long run, however complicated it looks, really means something like, ‘I pointed the telescope to such and such a part of the sky at 2:20am on January 15th and saw so-and-so,’ or, ‘I put some of this stuff in a pot and heated it to such-and-such a temperature and it did so-and-so.’ Do not think I am saying anything against science: I am only saying what its job is.

And the more scientific a man is, the more (I believe) he would agree with me that this is the job of science—and a very useful and necessary job it is too. But why anything comes to be there at all, and whether there is anything behind the things science observes—something of a different kind—this is not a scientific question. If there is ‘Something Behind’, then either it will have to remain altogether unknown to men or else make itself known in some different way. The statement that there is any such thing, and the statement that there is no such thing, are neither of them statements that science can make. And real scientists do not usually make them. It is usually the journalists and popular novelists who have picked up a few odds and ends of half-baked science from textbooks who go in for them. After all, it really is a matter of common sense. Supposing science ever became complete so that it knew every single thing in the whole universe. Is it not plain that the questions, ‘Why is there a universe?’ ‘Why does it go on as it does?’ ‘Has it any meaning?’ would remain just as they were?” (C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, pp. 22-23)

Part of the problem is that I didn’t provide a rigorous definition of Science, which I tried to acknowledge at the end.

You’re right in saying that the problem is an ambiguity in the definition of “Science.” We define Science mostly by the interests of scientists, not by a coherent definition of “Science.” This means that “Science” can end up meaning a lot of different things. For example, if we define Science as “theories based on empirical data,” we’re basically defining Science as a posteriori knowledge. But how do we restrict our definition? It’s difficult to say.

However, I think the main point that I was trying to make is that the sorts of conclusions that scientists tend to make are based on philosophical considerations that are largely independent of the empirical data. And considerations about God, for the most part, fall into that category.

This is very good thinking. I especially like the sound of “Science of the gaps.” That said, I’m not sure your argument here works.

First, you set out to show that part of the work of science is the construction of theories. Then you point out that these theories are evaluated on the basis of non-empirical criteria. So far so good – this is clearly correct. But then you argue that the above facts imply that science cannot have anything to say about the existence of God because the question of God is a metaphysical rather than a scientific one. On what grounds are you making this distinction? It seems to me that when you conceded that theory-forming is a part of science, you opened the door for science to come to metaphysical conclusions (i.e. there is no aether). Unless you are trying to say that non-empirical criteria like Occam’s razor and the principle of induction are in fact inappropriate in God talk, which I don’t think will fly very well with many people. I suppose the discussion is confounded by an ambiguity in our definition of science. Science, as a theory-forming entity, can say things about God. Science, as a purely empirical enterprise (if such a thing can exist) can say nothing about God.

The problem, as I see it, is that the work of theory forming and the work of empirical data collection require exceedingly different sets of skills, such that the people who we consider “scientists” are hardly qualified to draw serious conclusions from their work. The other half of science, the theoretical half, is done by philosophers. This, too, is problematic, because philosophers often feel little need to respect what has been empirically determined. So the whole system is dysfunctional.

As long as you admit that science has something to say about poltergeists, you have to admit that it can also have something to say about God.

First, you set out to show that part of the work of science is the construction of theories. Then you point out that these theories are evaluated on the basis of non-empirical criteria. So far so good – this is clearly correct. But then you argue that the above facts imply that science cannot have anything to say about the existence of God because the question of God is a metaphysical rather than a scientific one. On what grounds are you making this distinction? It seems to me that when you conceded that theory-forming is a part of science, you opened the door for science to come to metaphysical conclusions (i.e. there is no aether). Unless you are trying to say that non-empirical criteria like Occam’s razor and the principle of induction are in fact inappropriate in God talk, which I don’t think will fly very well with many people. I suppose the discussion is confounded by an ambiguity in our definition of science. Science, as a theory-forming entity, can say things about God. Science, as a purely empirical enterprise (if such a thing can exist) can say nothing about God.

The problem, as I see it, is that the work of theory forming and the work of empirical data collection require exceedingly different sets of skills, such that the people who we consider “scientists” are hardly qualified to draw serious conclusions from their work. The other half of science, the theoretical half, is done by philosophers. This, too, is problematic, because philosophers often feel little need to respect what has been empirically determined. So the whole system is dysfunctional.

As long as you admit that science has something to say about poltergeists, you have to admit that it can also have something to say about God.