Theoretical Concerns in Atonement Theology – Part I of III

At the recommendation of our very own dearly beloved John Joseph Porter, I recently spent some time thinking about this article by Tim Bayne at Oxford and Greg Restall at the University of Melbourne.  Bayne and Restall consider several common models of the atonement in succession and, finding each one wanting, propose their own – a participatory model in which the atonement is accomplished by the believer dying and rising with Christ.  I find their model of the atonement unconvincing for several reasons that I will explain later on in this series, but my main focus will simply be to outline the explananda for which I think any successful theory of the atonement must account.  I feel motivated to take this approach primarily because I think it will be helpful for me in my own thinking about the atonement but also because in my readings I have encountered a disturbing number of accounts of the atonement that seem either explanatorily vacuous or downright heretical.  Because of space issues, this week I will constrain myself to clarifying the notion of a theory of the atonement.

So, what is a theory of the atonement?  Bayne and Restall hit the nail on the head with their definition: “A model of atonement is a model of God’s way of dealing with sin.”  Here we have already encountered the main players in any atonement theology.  Foremost there is God, the God of Abraham, the Jewish and Christian God.  Then there is sin (and, of course, sinners).  Sin is universally recognized as problematic, though there is disagreement concerning why and how.  For example, if the problem of sin is construed in terms of a failure on the part of humanity to perform a certain duty to God (Bayne and Restall call this kind of construction deontic), then the problem of sin can be solved by a change in the relationship between God and man.  If, on the other hand, sin is construed as a condition that inheres in human beings (the authors refer to this conception as ontological), then the problem of sin can be solved only by a change in humans themselves.  It will be helpful to assume a single theory of sin at the beginning of this discussion for clarity as we proceed, and in fact I have already partially developed one in my previous posts here and here.  To summarize and expand on my previous thoughts:

Sins are actions of moral agents.  Sins get their sinfulness from their tendency either to reinforce a proper relationship between the individual and God or to degrade such a relationship.  This proper relationship, which can be helpfully denoted by the Hebrew term shalom, is the end or telos of human beings.  It involves worship of and intimacy with God as well as stewardship of his creation.  Thus a relational account of sin is primary.  Importantly, though, we read that sin (specifically, the sin of Adam) has somehow made it into the essence of humanness through the fall of man.  Thus we hear of our “sinful nature,” our disposition to continue to sin out of ignorance or malice or foolishness or desperation.  This is the proper expression for the intuition that there is an ontological component to sin.  It is important to remember, though, that our sinful nature is a property of ourselves whereas sins are actions we perform.  To confuse our sinful nature with sin itself is to make a category mistake.

There are also good reasons to talk about sin deontically.  Foremost, as Anglican Bishop N.T. Wright points out in his marvelous Justification, God’s covenant with Abraham (God’s plan through Israel for the world) requires that Abraham and his descendants be in a right relationship with God and serve as a light and example to the nations.  Insofar as historical Israel took upon itself God’s covenant and then failed to keep up its end of the agreement, it failed to fulfill a duty to God.  But in this case the failure doesn’t constitute the sin – the sin produces the failure.  Deontic conceptions of sin, while useful because God’s covenant purpose with Israel plays so great a role in his plan for the salvation of creation, are therefore even further removed from the actuality of sin itself.

Given this account of sin, what would it mean for God to deal with sin?  Briefly, it would mean repairing the damage done to our relationship with God because of sin and erasing from us our tendency to sin.  Because God’s covenant introduces a deontic element to sin for the nation of Israel, and because God’s atonement plan is carried out through Abraham and his descendents, God must (if he is to be faithful to the covenant) also repair the failure of Israel to fulfill its destiny as God’s chosen people.

These are demanding constraints to put on a theory of atonement, and as we will see next week they are merely the beginning; to be scripturally as well as theologically sound a theory will need to satisfy several other criteria.  But a further explication of these theoretical concerns awaits another week of additional time and revelation.

Tags: academia, biblical studies, forgiveness, jesus, philosophy, salvation, theology