Theoretical Concerns in Atonement Theology – Part II of III
Last week, I spent some time laying out a theory of sin and tracing its implications for our evaluations of various atonement theologies. This week, I will press on by looking at several more considerations that will point us toward a proper understanding of the cross. It is not my purpose here to suggest any particular view of the atonement, but rather to enumerate the explanatory power an adequate atonement theology would need to have.
Foremost, as Bayne and Restall suggest, a theory of the atonement should be intelligible. What does this mean? That means no mysterious hand waving or promissory notes involved in its explication. If the atonement turns out to be impenetrable to the human intellect, then perhaps no theory will turn out to satisfy this requirement. If that is the case, we should conclude that there is no adequate way to understand the atonement. We should not develop a partial theory and then appeal to the impenetrability of the subject matter at an advanced stage. I raise this concern because I often read accounts of the atonement that reach a certain point, say the doctrine imputed righteousness, and then cease to proceed reasonably and appeal to the mysterious nature of God’s ways. God’s ways are indeed mysterious, but to surrender our expectation of intelligibility in theology is to invite the proliferation of distracting and possibly harmful nonsense.
Next, in order for a theory of the atonement to be truly Christian it must involve Jesus qua Messiah and Son of God. That is, it must account for why the atonement involved the Incarnation and the culmination of God’s promise to Israel. Perhaps this criterion seems obvious, but it deserves mention if only to draw attention to the flaw in the numerous atonement theologies that involve Jesus being nothing more than an inspiring example to the rest of humanity. A useful test: M. Gandhi was, like Jesus, a wise and inspiring man who died an undeserved death. A proper theory of the atonement must explain why it was Jesus, rather than M. Gandhi, who achieved the reconciliation between God and man (and it doesn’t count to say that Jesus beat Gandhi to the punch).
A good theory must avoid making God a poor planner. That is, it is not admissible to say that God thought that Plan X or Idea Y would work, but it turned out to be a bad idea so He changed His mind and tried something else. Such an account would call into question God’s omnipotence and omniscience (and indeed, his competence). This is primarily a difficulty for atonement theologies that regard the Old Covenant as a failure or mistake.
Miscellaneously, an atonement theology must also provide explanations of the following phenomena: justification, sanctification, salvation, propitiation/substitution, baptism, union with Christ, the Church, the New Covenant, works, divine sonship, the Law, the flesh, and the Gentile problem.
Next week, I will look at several common accounts of the atonement in light of these considerations.
